Regulation, Competition and Technical Efficiency in Bus Public Transport: Discussing the Case of the Metropolitan Area of San José, Costa Rica by Contreras-Montoya, Carlos et al.
REGULATION, COMPETITION AND TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY IN BUS PUBLIC 
TRANSPORT: DISCUSSING THE CASE OF THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF SAN JOSÉ, 
COSTA RICA 
Carlos Contreras-Montoya 
Ministry of Public Works and Transport 
COSTA RICA
Enilson Santos 
Department of Civil Engineering 
Federal University of Rio G. do Norte 
BRAZIL
Rômulo Orrico Filho
Transportation Engineering Program 
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 
BRAZIL
ABSTRACT 
In the last two decades the relative roles of regulation and competition in promoting efficiency in 
urban bus industry has emerged as a central theme in both technical and academic debate. Empirical 
studies have concentrated in European, North American and Australian cases, as well as translog 
functions have been the main technical tool used in empirical analysis. In this paper, we focus on a 
Latin American case —  San José, Costa Rica —  using DEA techniques for the assessment of 
technical efficiency of bus service private provision under public regulation. Conclusions highlight a 
significant technical inefficiency level in the industry. Operators running their services efficiently are 
identified in order to provide industry benchmarkings. 
INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the seventies, debate on efficiency of publicly or privately operated urban buses has 
become a major theme both in academic and technical arenas. The interest on efficiency matters 
regarding local bus markets gave rise in the last two decades to significant research concerning the 
relative roles of regulation and competition in urban bus industry. As it should be expected, empirical 
studies have been concentrated in European, North American and Australian cases. Furthermore, 
translog functions have been the main technical tool for discussing the merits of market-driven and 
publicly coordinated solutions in the industry development. In this paper, we focus on a Latin 
American case —  the Metropolitan Area of San José, Costa Rica. From a methodological point of 
view, Data Envelopment Analysis is the methodological tool used in order to assess technical 
efficiency of bus service private providers operating under public regulation. 
Geographical and demographic aspects of Great San José are initially described in order to 
characterize the environment of public transport. Following this, the existing regulatory framework is 
analyzed, with an emphasis on the competitive environment that regulatory design and practice should 
be able to induce in local public transport markets. Expected impacts of such regulation on the 
technical efficiency of bus operators are discussed and related to firms  ´ strategies addressed to 
reducing competitive pressures, growing market power, bettering financial results and so on. 
   
Finally, operators  ´ economic performance is assessed with the application of Data Envelopment 
Analysis on a database containing information on inputs — fleet size, operating and administrative 
personal total wages, gas oil costs — and outputs measured in vehicle-km produced. The impacts of 
regulation, especially quantity regulation, in determining the levels of technical efficiency reached by 
providers is then explored and discussed. 
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF SAN JOSÉ, COSTA RICA 
As in general, Latin American cities are strongly dependent upon bus public transport. Local buses are 
responsible by 65% to 85% of all motorized displacements in urban agglomerations, mainly due to 
low motorization rates (a fact related to unequal income distribution) and poor performance or 
absolute absence of rail transit options.   
Nevertheless, the importance of local bus industry to urban economic efficiency has not been largely 
studied. In effect, bus industry production costs remains largely unknown although fare regulation is 
generally a central item in regulatory framework as well as in public and political debate regarding 
local bus provision. In the sense that bus public transport is a very important input to urban economic 
dynamics, it is a surprising fact that production cost structure and operators  ´ productivity and 
technical efficiency are not carefully analyzed yet. Furthermore, it should be highlighted that both 
State and incumbents are not aware of knowing in-depth about production factors interrelationships, 
or about impacts of different vehicular sizes or technologies, or about real economic meaning of 
regulatory decisions respect to financial and operational equilibrium of bus networks. 
Population and territory 
   
These conditions apply to urban transport system in San José Metropolitan Area. This is the main 
urban agglomeration in Costa Rica, a country with a population around 3.85 million inhabitants 
distributed over a little more than fifty thousand square kilometers and an yearly growth of 2%. The 
demographical census of 2000 registered an urbanization rate about 46% and economic surveys point 
out an GDP per capita around US$ 2,573 (exchange rate: US$ 1= 233 colones) in the fiscal year of 
1996. Inflation annual rates are between 10-15% (13% in 1997, the year to which database used in 
this paper was constructed).      
The Province of San José has a territorial extension of 4,959 km2 — almost 10% of the country’s area. 
The San José Metropolitan Area is inserted in the Province, occupying an area of 365 km2. It 
comprises eleven cantones (municipalities) which have an aggregate population around 1.2 million 
inhabitants — or 30% respect to population of entire Costa Rica. These figures highlights the meaning 
of Great San José as a nucleus of population concentration: two of three urban inhabitants of Costa 
Rica live in this urban region with a density around 3,000 inhabitants by square kilometer. Population 
of Great San José showed an annual rate of growth of 2.3 % (INICEM, 1995) in the period 1970-
1990, but this rate may be greater for the last decade due to immigration from neighbor countries, 
mainly Nicaragua. As in other Latin American cases, in Great San José the growth of population is 
greatly absorbed in peripheral metropolitan areas with poor urban infrastructure, except for the social 
dwelling big projects developed by State — it is the case of the communities of Alajuelita, Hatillo and 
Pavas, in the south.  
Public Transport System 
Public transport system in Great San José comprises exclusively road transport. Mainly bus lines form 
the network although minibuses (26 to 44 seats) and microbuses (9 to 25 seats) are also used. 
Irrespective of vehicle size, private operators under public concession or permission run bus routes 
and there is no State owned operator. In the last days of 1996, according to data from the Ministry of 
Public Works and Transport (MOPT, by Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), there were 
1,038 urban buses in Great San José. These buses were distributed in 130 routes conceded to 47 
private operators that registered monthly 16.65 million passengers in 226 thousand round trips. By 
their turn, 187 minibuses and microbuses — distributes in 30 routes — were producing monthly 49 
thousand round trips and registering 1.89 million passengers.  
It is worthy to note that more recently some supply of irregular services using microbuses and vans is 
being developed in those peripheral communities above mentioned. Also the emergence of private 
cars operated as taxis but without the necessary authorization may be noted. These informal services 
are being run in direct competition (on-street competition) with regulated regular buses, but they are 
not yet as much as to supersede regulated buses in any particular market. So, in the year 1976 for what 
empirical analysis is developed in this paper it can be stated that the only competitors that regulated 
buses were facing were the authorized taxis and private automobile.        
Institutional Arrangement and Regulation 
Institutional arrangement for organizing public transport (including in urban areas) in Costa Rica is 
based upon central Government tutelage (charged to MOPT) over an activity legally defined as a 
public service in the French sense. Acts that were providing legal support for public transport 
organization and management were, in 1996: 
x Act n. 3503 (1965, May 10th) that regulates road passenger transportation, 
x Act n. 5406 (1973, October 31st) that regulates taxi transport, 
x Act n. 6324 (1979, May 24th) that defines road provision and administration, and 
x Act n. 5930 (1976, December 13th), lately reformed by Acts n. 6249 (1978, May 2nd) and n. 6250 
(1993, March 30th), which relates to traffic.    
The Act 3503 establishes the public service character of passenger transport and defines the MOPT as 
the State organism responsible for regulation, control and monitoring the activity. The same Act 
defines that service provision may be delegated by the MOPT to private operators under the national 
normative. It is important to remark here that MOPT tutelage applies to any geography of road 
passenger transport, from urban to international routes. Furthermore, the Act creates a Transport 
Technical Commission in order to define the administrative procedures that MOPT shall follow in the 
delegation process. The Act 6324 enlarged the competences of Transport Technical Commission that 
became responsible by the entire delegation procedure, comprising operator choice, operational 
monitoring, delegation renewing or suspension, as well as defining fare calculation and revision. 
Later, in 1996, September 5th, Act n. 7593 instituted the Regulatory Authority for Public Services that 
meant a real reduction of the attributions of Transport Technical Commission. After that, the 
Commission no more decided ultimately respect to fares and other regulatory aspects but the 
Regulatory Authority should approve its decisions. Completing the picture, in 2000, Transport 
Technical Commission was substituted by the Public Transport Council: while the Commission was a 
representative of MOPT, the Council is composed by representatives of MOPT and other instances of 
Government, private operators and users.   
As it can be seen, legal situation of urban public transport in Costa Rica follows French traditional 
Administrative Law, although the growing importance of an independent regulatory agency means 
some intrusion of the public utility concept. Nevertheless, network planning and fare definitions 
remain as Government functions and private firms that awarded concession contracts face operational 
features. 
The choice of the private operator should be ever made through a public procurement process that 
comprises competitive bidding for the contract. Contract duration is 7 years but it can be renewed. In 
exceptional situations it is possible to temporarily permit a route operation by means of a negotiation 
but just while a public procurement process is being developed and implemented. However, 
regulatory practice has not followed the formal and legal processes. The absence of clear rules 
regarding to tendering as well the political pressures made by incumbents have contributed to a 
situation where exceptional permissions are used almost as a rule and contract renewing is always 
granted without any formal evaluation. An exception to this may be noted in the period 1991-93 when 
a great quantity of routes formerly permitted were subject to tendering processes despite strong 
incumbents reactions and some opposition within the State bureaucracy. 
Regarding fare definition, this is made in a route-by-route basis: a standard cost sheet is applied to 
route conditions respect to fleet and patronage and a pre-defined rate of profit marks up average costs 
in order to calculate the route fare (Aragão et al., 2000). There was no awareness regarding 
parameters and coefficients used in fare calculations until 1997 when the Regulatory Authority 
contracted a private consultancy to develop a fare-calculating model in which service quality criteria 
were considered. No concrete results of this attempt may be showed until now: although a Rule for 
Evaluating and Qualifying Passenger Public Transport Services  has been published there is no clear 
understanding about how evaluations should affect fares. Furthermore, there is no security about the 
possibility of applying the rules once legal framework does not refer to a systematic evaluation. The 
fact is that Public Transport Council approved an administrative decision (in 2000, August) by which 
every public transport concession in the Metropolitan Area of San José was renewed. The arguments 
used were the high costs and complexities of a tendering process as well as the need for consolidate 
the bus sector (La Nación, 2000, August 31st).   
This political decision shall be understood as a result of a long time period of applying a regulatory 
regime based on the absence of competition. The incumbent operators conform now a closed group 
able to develop regulatory capture: if not in a formal sense at least in a practical sense. That is why 
tendering does not occur and contract renewing is done without any assessment of operator’s merits.  
TECHNICAL EFFICENCY OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT IN GREAT SAN JOSÉ 
In order to examine technical efficiency revealed in urban bus industry of San José Metropolitan Area 
this paper uses Data Envelopment Analysis — DEA. DEA techniques are mathematical programming 
approaches that permit simultaneously to construct, given a technology and a set of observations, the 
efficiency frontier and to assess, to each individual observation, how far it is from the efficiency 
frontier. DEA approach is based on the best practices in combining inputs and outputs — efficiency 
frontier —, and on the optimization of individual decision-making units — DMUs. So, in DEA, 
production frontier is defined as the maximum quantity of product possible to obtain from a given set 
of resources or inputs: a piece-wise linear frontier is determined that contains all Pareto-efficient 
observations.      
There are three basic models used to perform Data Envelopment Analysis:  
x Constant returns to scale, also called the CCR model (due to Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes; see 
Charnes et al., 1978) or CRS/E/I/A (Lins and Meza, 2000); 
x Variable returns to scale, also called the BCC model (due to Banker, Charnes and Copper; see 
Banker et al., 1984) or VRS/E/I/A (Lins e Meza, 2000) 
x Non-increasing returns to scale, usually called NIRS, or NIRS_RAD_IN in this paper. 
In the work described in this paper, we used the software EMS — Efficiency Measurement System —, 
Version 1.3, 2000, developed by Holger Scheel in the University of Dortmund. The denomination 
given to the three basic models is compatible with software outputs (Scheel, 2000). 
 Fig. 1 - Frontiers CRS, VRS, NIRS and the determination of economies of scale 
In Fig. 1, considering one input and one output, we show frontiers obtained with the models CRS, 
VRS and NIRS, as well as the positions of inefficient DMUs ETa and ETb.
With the models VRS and CRS it is possible to obtain a measure of scale efficiency for each DMU. 
This implies to decompounding the measurement of CRS technical efficiency into two parts: the first 
refers to scale inefficiency and the second relates to “pure” technical inefficiency. If a single DMU 
registers different technical efficiencies as measured by CRS or VRS model, then scale inefficiency 
exists that may be measured on the basis of the difference. In Fig. 1, considering the DMU ETb, its 
CRS technical inefficiency is the distance ETb-C.  Regarding VRS model, the technical inefficiency of 
ETb is given by ETb-V and V-C is the scale inefficiency of ETb.
The Database 
Data were gathered in four secondary sources:  
x Ministry of Public Works and Transport, mainly the reports of Technical Studies and of Public 
Transport Departments; 
x Registers of Operators Accountancy; 
ETa
ETbPb
P
I
c
v
0
R
Fronteira NIRS
Fronteira VRS
Fronteira CRS
x Consultancy Report contracted by Regulatory Authority in 1997; 
x Ministry of Treasury. 
The built database is composed by monthly information (year 1997) respect to 31 operators, e.g. two 
thirds of total incumbents of the system. The sampled operators were responsible by 81 from the 130 
existing routes and their aggregated fleet summed up 70% of total operating fleet in San José 
Metropolitan Area. An analysis of all available information regarding the 47 operators in the system 
was performed and it was possible to suppose that conclusions obtained with empirical analysis of the 
sampled operators may be generalized as the operators not being in the sample may be represented by 
linear combinations of the sampled ones.  
Used data were the following: 
 Monthly produced vehicle-km (Q), a measure of service produced (in thousand km) 
 Fleet size (fleet), an input measured in quantity of available vehicles to firm production (number 
of seats is approximately homogeneous in the sampled operators) 
 Operational manpower (desop), an input defined as the total wages paid monthly to operative 
personnel  (in ten thousand colones)
 Administrative manpower (desad), an input defined as the total wages paid monthly to 
administrative personnel (in ten thousand colones)
 Fuel consumption (combus), an input defined as the total expenses regarding monthly fuel 
acquisitions (in ten thousand colones)
Operators are represented by codes randomly defined, from ET1 to ET31. In Tab. 1, each variable is 
presented in terms of sample median, mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation (standard 
deviation/mean).  
Tab. 1 – General statistics of variables 
Sample characteristics Q fleet desop desad combus 
Median 60,79 16 204,28 23,65 210,58 
Mean 70,96 22,55 242,91 36,30 287,01 
Standard deviation 47,67 17,46 200,90 37,61 249,59 
Coefficient of variation 0,67 0,77 0,83 1,04 0,87 
It can be observed that there is an expressive variability in the sample, both in what respect inputs and 
outputs. The differences in fleet size and the fact that variables are measured absolutely are the 
reasons for that the sample presents these characteristics. Also worthy to note is the independence 
between inputs as can be demonstrated in the correlation matrix shown below. 
Tab. 2 – Correlation matrix between inputs and output 
 Q=v-km fleet desop desad combus 
Q=v-km 1,000     
fleet 0,931 1,000    
desop 0,787 0,827 1,000   
desad 0,643 0,666 0,831 1,000  
combus 0,951 0,942 0,715 0,611 1,000 
It may be observed in Tab. 2 that chosen inputs are relevant to explain the production Q. Expenses 
with administrative personnel (desad) is the input with lower correlation with production. High 
correlation value between fleet and fuel expenses (combus) was expected. Nevertheless it was decided 
to maintain the two variables due to the fact that fuel consumption is linked to operational 
characteristics more strictly than fleet. So, it is supposed that they can have differentiated 
contributions to explain output variations.  
Results of the application of CRS and VRS models 
For each DMU in the sample, results were obtained under the models of constant returns to scale –
CRS – and variable returns to scale – VRS –.  They are:  
x Individual scores 
x Reference DMUs to those that are not in the efficiency frontier — reference DMUs are 
benchmarks for inefficient ones — and intensity of influence of an efficient DMU over inefficient 
ones  
x Quantity of DMUs to which an efficient DMU serves as reference.
In the case of CRS model, the reference set is formed by four DMUs. In the case of VRS, the set 
comprises 11 DMUs. So, considering as given the scale of production, aroun a third of sampled 
DMUs were using inputs efficiently. The DMU ET7 is highlighted as a benchmarking and this 
conclusion implies its production practices should be studied in-depth. 
In Tab. 3, below, a synthesis is shown of results obtained for short and log term efficiency. Lowest 
values of efficiency scores are also shown. It is remarkable that ET12 operates with an inefficiency 
around 50%. One sixth of sampled DMUs operates with a short run efficiency level below 70%. The 
Tab. 3 also remarks those DMUs operating upon the efficiency frontier. 
Tab. 3 - Technical Efficiency and Reference Sets 
 Technical Efficiency 
 Mean Minimal 
Reference Set 
Short term 74,99% 42,37% (ET12) ETs: 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21,26, 29 
Long term 85,33% 51,78% (ET12) ETs: 7, 16, 18, 20 
As discussed above, this kind of analysis permits the calculus of scale efficiency of each DMU. But it 
does not provide a classification of the kind of returns to scale: decreasing, constant or increasing 
ones. This information may be obtained solving NIRS model and comparing the results with those 
obtained for VRS model. Tab. 4 shows the results. 
Tab. 4 – DEA Classification of DMUs according to scale efficiency and returns to scale 
(DEA with VRS e NIRS models) 
DMU
SCORE
CRS
SCORE
VRS
SCORE
NIRS 
Scale efficiency
Returns to scale 
crs: constant 
irs: increasing 
drs: decreasing 
    ET1 80,51% 87,61% 80,51% 91,90% irs 
    ET2 57,35% 82,69% 57,35% 69,36% irs 
    ET3 45,67% 57,84% 45,67% 78,96% irs
    ET4 69,83% 70,25% 70,25% 99,40% drs 
    ET5 73,28% 74,99% 73,28% 97,72% irs 
    ET6 57,97% 81,35% 81,35% 71,26% drs 
    ET7 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% crs 
    ET8 90,81% 100,00% 90,81% 90,81% irs 
    ET9 95,23% 100,00% 95,23% 95,23% irs 
    ET10 68,94% 100,00% 100,00% 68,94% drs 
    ET11 75,79% 76,34% 75,79% 99,28% irs 
    ET12 42,37% 51,78% 51,78% 81,83% drs
    ET13 65,09% 67,26% 65,09% 96,77% irs 
    ET14 64,83% 64,87% 64,83% 99,94% irs 
    ET15 87,50% 89,40% 89,40% 97,87% drs 
    ET16 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% crs 
    ET17 68,39% 71,31% 68,39% 95,91% irs 
    ET18 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% crs 
    ET19 91,37% 100,00% 91,37% 91,37% irs 
    ET20 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% crs 
    ET21 75,46% 100,00% 75,46% 75,46% irs 
    ET22 54,49% 81,25% 54,49% 67,06% irs 
    ET23 96,12% 96,25% 96,12% 99,86% irs
    ET24 57,16% 61,86% 61,86% 92,40% drs 
    ET25 73,34% 73,63% 73,63% 99,61% drs 
    ET26 72,42% 100,00% 100,00% 72,42% drs 
    ET27 70,49% 93,43% 93,43% 75,45% drs 
    ET28 54,90% 94,62% 94,62% 58,02% drs
    ET29 96,50% 100,00% 96,50% 96,50% irs 
    ET30 82,07% 82,87% 82,07% 99,03% irs 
    ET31 56,78% 85,70% 85,70% 66,25% drs 
Means 74,99% 85,33% 81,13% 87,88%
It should be noted that when technical efficiencies obtained with CRS and VRS models are equal then 
operator is running under constant returns to scale (Coelli et al., 1998). In Tab. 4, it may be seen that 4 
operators are producing in a situation of constant returns to scale. In a region of increasing returns to 
scale it was possible to find 16 sampled operators. And eleven of them were found to be producing in 
a region of decreasing returns to scale. 
Four cases are highlighted in Tab. 4: those of DMUs ET3 and ET12 — with the largest distances to 
efficient frontier — and those of DMUs ET23 and ET28 — with the lowest distance to efficient 
frontier — both from the point of view of inputs. 
Tab. 5 shows the 11 DMUs which compound the reference set according to VRS analysis, as well as 
their classification respect to the kind of returns to scale they present. We added a column with the 
DMU fleet in order to provide the scope of reference set (Range of fleet in sample: 5-to-74 vehicles). 
Tab. 4 – Reference set and fleet size by DMU 
DMU SCORE RETORNOS FROTA 
ET7 100,00% crs 16 
ET8 100,00% irs 7 
ET9 100,00% irs 10 
ET10 100,00% drs 74 
ET16 100,00% crs 12 
ET18 100,00% crs 14 
ET19 100,00% irs 5 
ET20 100,00% crs 10 
ET21 100,00% irs 5 
ET26 100,00% drs 33 
ET29 100,00% irs 10 
In the reference set, of course, we find those 4 DMUs operating with a scale efficiency of 100%. 
These DMUs are on the efficiency frontier and producing in a point of optimal scale. These DMUs 
are ET7, ET16, ET18 and ET20. The mean efficiency score of inefficient DMUs — those not in the 
reference set — is around 77% with a standard deviation of 12,5%. 
FINAL COMMENTS 
An extended and rigorous performance analysis concerning to public transport industry in developed 
countries is needed. In metropolitan areas of developing world, public transport is responsible by 
carrying people to work and other urban activities in a greater proportion than in developed ones. So, 
as public transport is a general input to urban production, greater costs of production inefficiency in 
the bus industry result in greater production costs for general economic activity.
As Latin American cities, almost in general, has adopted the public service concept as a basis for 
organizing production of urban transport services, public regulation must behave in order to obtain the 
maximum of technical efficiency and regulatory framework should be designed with this objective in 
mind. Application of DEA techniques may help this public effort, in the sense that they may identify 
and quantify good production practices, as well as highlight unacceptable levels of technical 
inefficiency. 
In what concerns to empirical analysis showed in this paper, it is possible to conclude that, given the 
scale of production, just one third of all operators in the bus industry of San José Metropolitan Area 
are running services efficiently. In a short-term perspective, technical efficiency in the industry is 
around 85% while in the long run the figure goes down to 75%. These figures show significant 
technical inefficiencies in the industry and points out the need for public intervening in order to 
achieve higher levels of efficiency. 
Another interesting result is the identifying of benchmarking firms whose production practices should 
be examined by public regulators and inefficient incumbents in order to improve the economic 
performance of the whole system. Incentive regulation may be used in order to induce inefficient 
firms to become closer to efficiency frontiers, as well as to guarantee that efficient ones will stand on 
ideal production points.
Competitive pressures may be posed to incumbents during the contract period in the sense that 
performance evaluation may be used as a criteria to be observed when the decision moment about 
contract renewing arrives. DEA techniques may be an efficient technical aid for regulators and 
providers in a more competitive regulatory environment of local bus industry. 
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